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Ground (g)


Section 30(1)(g) of the 1954 Act provides the following as a ground entitling the landlord to resist an order for a new lease:
    "that on termination of the current tenancy the landlord intends to occupy the holding for the purposes of a business carried on by him".

Judicial gloss

However, the courts have put a gloss on this simple statement. For example: "A man cannot properly be said to intend to do a work when he has not got the means to carry it out. He may hope to do so: he will not have the intention to do so". (Roehorn v Barry Corporation, Lord Denning). Or "The question whether the landlords intend to occupy the premises is primarily one of fact, but the authorities establish that, to prove such an intention, the landlord must prove two things. First, a genuine bona fide intention on the part of the landlords that they intend to occupy the premise for their own purposes. Second, the landlords must prove that, in point of possibility, they have a reasonable prospect of being able to bring this occupation by their own act of volition". (Gregson v Cyril Lord Ltd [1962] 3 All ER 907).

The test (including the judicial gloss) therefore has two limbs to it. Does the landlord have:
  • A bona fide intention to occupy the holding for the purposes of the business (a subjective element)?
  • A real possibility of starting the business (an objective element)?

Limits of the gloss

There are two fairly recent cases that remind us that the purpose of the judicial gloss is only to ensure that the landlord satisfies the court as to intention and that the burden is not a particularly heavy one:

In Dolgellau Golf Club v Hett (1998) L intended to take over and run a golf course. He had no schemes, no indication of likely cost, no real idea of finances. Yet the application for a new lease was refused.

In Gatwick Parking Services Ltd v Sargent [2000] 2 EGLR 45 a collateral "mother of all battles" over planning permission did not stop the landlord from successfully relying upon s30(1)(g).

Auld LJ in Dolgellau Golf Club at 79E:
    ".. the function of the judicial gloss on the statutory test of intention is to determine the reality of a landlords intention to start a busine ... THIS IS AN EXTRACT OF THE FULL TEXT. TO GET THE FULL TEXT, SEE BELOW

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